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Chapter Twelve: The Metaphysics of Morals and Politics 
Reading Iris Murdoch's Metaphysics as a guide to morals 




Murdoch’s metaphysics is dialectical and historical. It is dialectical in that it establishes a series of 
internal relations between forms of experience. The personal and the public, the disordered and the 
ordered, and unity and plurality are mutually related constituents of her relational perspective. Past and 
present function in a similar way. The object of metaphysical understanding is present experience, which 
at the same time presumes a past from which it has emerged. The historicity of the present entails the 
time-bound operations of metaphysics. Whereas classical metaphysics as practised by, say, Plato or 
Spinoza, may be taken as purporting to provide a rational first-order guide to the nature of reality, 
Murdoch’s metaphysics operates by making sense of the relations obtaining between known items within 
or intimated by our experience. The questions of metaphysics, for Murdoch, arise out of reflection upon 
contemporary experience and its form develops historically as metaphysicians engage critically with 
contemporary questions and the work of past metaphysicians. Murdoch takes metaphysics to be holistic 
in its review of how partial forms of experience are only fully intelligible in terms of their location within 
the whole. Metaphysics identifies the contributions of religion, art, morality to its own integrative 
understanding of experience. They register the order and unities within experience that metaphysics 
explains holistically. Like all aspects of experience, religion, art and morals change over time. In modern 
times, supra-natural claims are renounced in favour of what can be known within experience.  
Modernity is a time of demythologisation and it forms the context for present philosophical 
exploration of meaning. Hence the supernatural elements of religion are not to be sustained in the light of 
the prevailing rationalist temper and a critical philosophical perspective sets limits to a religious 
perspective as well as identifying its significance. Likewise art is understood critically by philosophy so 
that its sentimental and consolatory forms are dismissed, but its awareness of underlying unities is 
respected. Murdoch’s metaphysics is not a world-denying Neo-Platonism, in which the ideal is divorced 
from the apparently real. Her reading of Plato allows for a modern sensibility that links speculation on the 
absolutely good to the nature of experience as a whole and takes the ideal to be a projection from and 
reflection back upon the actual. Theory and practice, imperfection and perfection and past and present are 
mutually implicated in an integrative metaphysics.1 
Murdoch was aware of the delicacy of her metaphysical thinking. She takes on board a thoroughly 
modern perspective, in which the limits of knowledge are recognised and empirical understanding is 
valued. Simultaneously she draws upon Platonic metaphysics to resume an ambitious conception of 
philosophy’s role in framing a broad metaphysical picture of a multi-dimensional but unitary reality. 
Murdoch’s last published philosophical text, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (hereafter MGM) focuses 
upon morality and metaphysics, showing how they are mutually related. Metaphysics descries unity and 
order, which allows for a moral perspective that goes beyond the individual ego. Morality attests to a 
vision of goodness that unites the self with others. Morality and metaphysics are here informed by a 
modern sensibility in that Murdoch highlights the processes of demythologisation that frame 
1 For a discussion of Murdoch’s reading of Plato, see Browning, 2018b, 178-190. 
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the ways in which we understand ourselves in modern times. Science, technology and a 
stripped-down notion of philosophy set the tone for a modern rational instrumentalism, 
whereby orienting schemes of metaphysics tend to be excluded. In responding to this context 
Murdoch enlists a form of Platonism, which is framed so as to meet and to supersede the 
philosophical temper of the moment. Murdoch’s Platonism is stripped of any associations 
with otherworldliness. Plato is invoked to provide a sense of the unity and truth which are the 
goals of philosophical understanding and which can anchor the pursuit of moral perfection. 
Truth and unity are perceived through art, religious practice and moral engagement, though 
the working towards truth and goodness is never to be completed. 
Murdoch’s metaphysics invokes preceding philosophers in establishing a way of 
seeing the world in which metaphysics is not abandoned but is undertaken so as to work with 
a demythologised present in recognising aspects of experience that perceive unity and 
goodness. Metaphysical exploration, for Murdoch, is not a matter of supra-mundane insight 
but a historically situated activity that reveals the dialectical interplay between forms of 
experience and how they constitute a whole that is meaningful. Murdoch’s reading of public 
and private morality, of the political and the personal, exhibits how she operates in providing 
metaphysical insight by perceiving the relatedness of aspects of experience. Personal morality 
depends upon public morality just as the point of the public world is to allow individual 
exploration of the personal. Public forms of morality are also shaped in part by personal 
exploration of experience just as the goodness of public life demands respect on the part of 
individual citizens. The moral perfectionism of personal morality underlines a commitment to 
the order and goodness of experience just as awareness of the calamities have befallen the 
public world admits evidence of manifest political imperfection. Order and disorder, 
goodness and evil, and the public and private are intertwined within experience and the point 
of Murdoch’s metaphysics is to show how they can be seen as working together. Murdoch 
had registered the distinctness of and connections between the political and moral worlds in 
her ‘A Postscript to ‘On “God” and “Good”’ (1966) in which she declares, ‘The idea of 
excellence has then a different operation in morals from its operation in politics, since a final 
acceptance of imperfection and incompleteness is built into politics in a way in which it is not 
built into morals’ (Murdoch 2011, 8). 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals  
Murdoch analyses relations between the personal and the political spheres in Chapter 12 of 
MGM, ‘Morals and Politics’. It highlights the limits of the public sphere and the 
perfectionism of personal morality. The meaning of the one sphere depends upon its relation 
to the other. In her early novels and philosophical essays Murdoch had entertained diffuse 
hopes for a socialist renewal. Jake Donoghue in Under the Net (1954) is confused about 
politics but remains a socialist. The Bell (1958) rehearses the aspirations and demise of a 
spiritual community that sets up a co-operative form of life. In her essay ‘A House of Theory’ 
(1958) she recognises how demythologisation in contemporary culture erodes belief in 
metaphysics, religion, visionary morals and radical political ideology. Hence, after the 
Second World War socialism faces challenges, notably due to a quiescent working class, 
apparent material affluence, and a gathering sense that radical ideological theories are 
untenable in the modern world (Murdoch 1997, 182). In her ‘A Postscript to ‘On “God” and 
“Good”’ (1966) she recognises how politics is distinct from morals due to the imperfections 
of the public sphere (Murdoch 2011, 8). By the time she writes MGM, Murdoch herself is 
thoroughly disillusioned with political utopianism. She is alert to the historical evidence that 
points to the horrors of misguided Utopianism. The repressiveness of current and recent 
socialist regimes, such as Communist China, underpins her distaste for radical socialism and 
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her concern to protect the rights of the individual against the state (MGM, 354-7). Her 
suspicion of totalitarianism is reflected in her novels, where survivors of repressive regimes, 
such as vulnerable Willy Kost in The Nice and the Good (1968) serve as haunting reminders 
of its dangers. Likewise her letters and journals attest to her recognition of the wreckage of 
human life that she had witnessed in the aftermath of European dictatorships and the Second 
World War.2 
In ‘Morals and Politics’ Murdoch turns decisively away from radicalism and utopian 
projects. She looks to the wisdom of past political philosophers such as the British empiricists 
who focus upon the limited but significant task of the state in providing security for 
individuals. This imperative to protect the individual is acknowledged to involve a distinction 
between the private and the public. She recognises this distinction to be central to classic 
liberal thought. She observes, ‘Liberal political thought posits a certain fundamental 
distinction between the person as citizen and the person as moral-spiritual individual’ (MGM, 
357). While accepting the imprecision of the terms of the distinction, she is willing to invoke 
it so as to limit the power of the state. She remarks that, ‘Society and so the state cannot be 
perfected, although perfection is a proper ideal or magnet for the individual as a moral agent.’ 
(MGM, p. 356) The distinction between the private and the public and the prioritisation of 
individual freedom are held by Murdoch to be distinctively modern. She recognises how 
Plato did not recognise the value of individual freedom and notes that Plato’s ideal 
commonwealth of the Republic sets the common good above that of individual satisfaction. 
(See Browning, 1991) 
Murdoch’s observation that the distinction between the private and the public is both 
relatively new and less than clear cut is accurate and is rehearsed by many political theorists.3 
In On Liberty J.S. Mill identifies the rationale for governmental activity and its limit to be 
that of preventing harm to other individuals (Mill 1989, 10). Mill values individual liberty 
and he rules out governmental regulation of an individual’s conduct when other individuals 
are not affected. Hence Mill distinguishes between self-regarding and other-regarding actions 
as determining the sphere of liberty to which individuals are entitled (Mill 1989, 34). This 
distinction is very difficult to specify precisely. All actions in some sense affect others, just as 
their inspiration is not merely private. Murdoch recognises the indeterminacy involved in 
separating a private sphere from a public one but maintains a difference between the two in 
order to protect an individual from violence, coercion and the dangers of an overly powerful 
state. She sees security to be vital for individual well-being and urges that politics must be 
regulated by fundamental moral norms. This proposed mode of regulation is distinct from 
personal morality even if regulatory norms are affected by the latter. She accepts a distinction 
that is useful even if it is hard to specify in precise terms. She distinguishes between a public 
political world that is to be governed by highly general axioms prescribing rights and rules, 
and a personal sphere of moral aspiration to which an individual is to be committed. Personal 
moral life is perfectionist. An individual is to aspire to do the right thing. Personal morality is 
a spiritual journey, where the self develops via its moral encounters with others and aims for 
perfection. Public regulation attends to the imperfect political world where individuals are 
liable to suffer. It is not perfectionist but rather guards against manifest imperfections by 
protecting the basic requirements for a decent life. Murdoch observes, ‘Society, and so the 
                                                          
2 Murdoch’s journals are held in Kingston University Library, and a collection of her letters was published in 
Horner and Rowe (2015). 
3 For analysis of the complicated relations between the individual and society, see Browning 1999, Browning 
2005, Browning 2016 and Berlin 1969.  
4 
 
state, cannot be perfected, although perfection is a proper ideal or magnet for the individual 
or moral agent’ (MGM, 356).  
Murdoch’s distinction between private and public morality does not amount to an 
absolute separation between two spheres and is not sanctioned by unassailable philosophical 
argument. It is a pragmatic way of drawing a line that works to protect individuals and to 
guard against the excesses of state intrusion into individual lives. It is a product of reflection 
upon modern political history. She is critical, however, of the Hegelian project of identifying 
an overall pattern to the development of history, and of Hegel’s Marxist successors who posit 
an end to history and justify political actions in terms of this endgame (MGM, 370). Murdoch 
is against any totalising political judgments that abstract from a messy contingent world in 
which rights are to supersede any projected end state. Her political priority is to protect 
individual rights. She argues, ‘The idea of Utopia is a danger in politics, it hints at a 
rectification of a primal fault, a perfect unity, it is impatient of contingency. The assertion of 
contingency, the rights of the object, the rights of the individual, these are connected’ (MGM, 
378). 
In establishing the limits that have to be respected in considering politics and in her 
critique of Hegel and Marx, Murdoch invokes Adorno’s neo-Hegelian critique of Hegel. 
Adorno reacts against the Hegelian tradition by critiquing totalising forms of thought. In 
contrast to Hegel’s reading of the inter-relations between subject and object in his 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Adorno admits the independence of the object. He rejects a 
finalising dialectic that is to yield a final solution to the exigencies of experience. Adorno 
allows for a negative and continuing open dialectical interplay between subject and object. 
Murdoch comments approvingly,  
This dialectical give-and-take mutually necessary relation between subject and object 
is not to be understood in a Hegelian manner as taking place within any sovereign 
determining totality, whether Hegel’s absolute, or a Marxist idea of history as a story 
with a happy ending. (MGM, 370)  
Adorno’s approach recognises contingent events that cannot be encapsulated in a tight 
theoretical scheme. Yet he also allows for inter-relations between the elements that are to be 
theorised. Murdoch sympathy for Adorno sheds light on her thought. She avoids totalising 
political thought by recognising a distinction between the personal and the public. They allow 
for differing objectives. In taking her cue from Adorno, however, Murdoch allows for 
interaction between the public and the private. Public laws are to protect and serve the 
individual. Perfectionist personal morality depends upon protection of the self from public 
imperfections. Again, personal moral thinking can contribute to the public agenda by framing 
ideas on how the welfare of individuals can be best secured by public provision. Murdoch 
envisages a mutual dependence or a kind of dialectic between the public and the private, 
though their separation is to be highlighted so as to prioritise the protection of the individual. 
Murdoch observes, ‘The idea of a separation (between the public and the private) is better 
here than that of dialectic or tension within a totality: it both emphasises a very (general) 
liberal) political value, and also helps to make sense of political scenes’ (MGM, 367).  
While personal morality is perfectionist, the public sphere is not set on achieving an 
ideal that might not be realisable. It is flexible and accommodates to the needs of the moment 
and deals with imperfections and deficiencies that require practical remedies. The dangers to 
individual welfare that follow from lax or ill-conceived regulation prioritise the maintenance 
of fundamental axioms that set up clear and firm rules that mediate the transactions of 
individuals. The rules of the game require to be set so as to protect fundamental needs. 
Murdoch urges that the public sphere is to be regulated by axioms securing basic 
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requirements for a decent life, for example the human rights of life and liberty should be 
protected. These rights need to be secured from interference by governments as well by 
individuals. The rights are to be derived from experience and history, reflecting what has 
proven to be fundamental to the ordinary pursuit of individual purposes. They demand public 
respect that is unconditional and unmediated, so these axioms are not to be systematised for 
that would detract from their immediacy. Public awareness of their absolute significance is 
dissipated if they are made to fit within an overarching theoretical formula. Murdoch 
observes, ‘They are barriers of principle which are not reducible to a system’ (MGM, 565). 
Rights also issue from considered reflection upon an historical changing world. They specify 
what is thought to be necessary in the public realm from time to time. Hence they are 
contestable, and they will vary across time and space, even if many of them, such as the right 
to life, will persist. Their historical piecemeal articulation means that they are not to be seen 
as the positive enactments of a supervening and universal natural law. Rather they evolve as 
political experience evolves and throws up issues that demand attention in the light of 
changing cultural moods and circumstances. There is no precise specification of the ways in 
which they will evolve. According to Oakeshott, a friend of Murdoch’s, there are no 
absolutes in considering political action. No ideology can provide for the subtlety of 
circumstances and we must look to traditions and what they imitate rather than ideological 
systems. Murdoch recounts a variety of ways in which the agenda for politics develops, 
noting the activities of feminist movements, and of single issue groups canvassing the rights 
of animals and the planet (MGM, 369). Deeply felt personal moral beliefs, for instance 
ecological concern for the planet and animal rights, might at one time seem individual 
eccentricities but, at another point in time might well be absorbed into the norms of the public 
culture. Murdoch is light on detail in specifying how issues are to be handled by political 
institutions and more specifically on how substantive aspects of socio-economic policy will 
be negotiated. Her highly generic account of how axioms are put on to the political agenda by 
groups is elliptical, but it intimates that she envisages a plural and democratic process by 
which norms and issues are debated and canvassed.  
Murdoch provides no clear-cut recipe for putting axioms on the political agenda and 
she recognises the contestable nature of public axioms. Their contestability, however, does 
not imply that obedience to them is optional. Public order and security depends upon their 
command of widespread support. Their efficacy depends upon their capacity to elicit 
obedience, and obedience derives from their moral approval on the part of citizens. Public 
morality is not entirely separate from personal morality in that individuals agree to public 
norms in the light of their moral beliefs. The public and the personal are linked dialectically 
by the formation and effective operation of axioms. Personal moral commitments inspire the 
adoption of axioms and reinforce community solidarity and the maintenance of laws and 
rights. There are, however, tensions between the public and the personal. While the axioms 
underpinning the operation of the public sphere demand support and obedience from citizens, 
on occasions the personal moral commitments of individuals will clash with public rules. 
Murdoch imagines moral commitments to be more than merely subjective preferences that 
can be put aside easily; they form part of an individual’s spiritual life. A clash between 
personal principle and public law raises the prospect of civil disobedience on the part of an 
individual to register their disagreement with the law and to canvas its overthrow. For 
Murdoch, civil disobedience is acceptable, even necessary, but should be practised sparingly, 
because there is value in the maintenance of a law insofar as it provides order. Murdoch 
allows civil disobedience but she takes it to be exceptional and problematic. In undertaking 
civil disobedience in a democratic society where laws and policies reflect public opinion, an 
individual must be prepared to argue the case in public debate. If the debate does not lead to a 
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change in the law then disobedience may be legitimate but the individual who refuses to obey 
the law must accept punishment for an offence. Disobedience is not to be generalised because 
it may weaken the force of public order, which allows for the very development of personal 
wide-ranging moral commitments that lie behind the civil disobedience. 
Murdoch’s account of basic axioms in the public sphere is relatively thin on the detail 
of how particular axioms are to be decided upon. But it should not be thought that Murdoch is 
conservative in her emphasis upon order and basic rights. She allows for the possibility of 
international rights superseding a merely national perspective. Moreover, in MGM and in her 
unpublished ‘Manuscript on Heidegger’ Murdoch specifically points to the provision of 
women’s rights (MGM, 361; Murdoch 1993, 58). Lovibond, though, has argued that 
Murdoch’s novels insinuate a resistance on her part to the full moral and intellectual 
autonomy of women that is also reflected in her moral philosophy (Lovibond 2011, 7). In a 
review of Lovibond’s Iris Murdoch, Gender and Philosophy, Hämäläinen has countered by 
observing, ‘one may suggest that her novels describe what is, rather than what should be’ 
(Hämäläinen, 2011). 
Murdoch’s novels cannot be simply read off from her philosophical writings. They 
reflect the social world so that it is no surprise that in her novels there is a differential 
treatment of men and women and that men have higher social status and dominate women 
routinely in the course of Murdoch’s narratives. This privileging of the social position of 
men, however, does not entail that Murdoch’s attitude to women is clear cut. Dooley has 
observed how Murdoch’s later novels show a more critical attitude to male adultery. (Dooley, 
2009) Moreover, Murdoch’s first-person male narrators do not determine how the novels are 
to be read. These men tend to be unreliable narrators and the bourgeois family structure, in 
which men dominate, is critiqued within the narratives.  
In assessing the role of women in Murdoch’s novels Johnson observes,  
Iris Murdoch’s novels pose in new and tantalising ways the question of what it means 
to write as a woman, to read as a woman. They disconcert and fascinate both female 
and male readers by continually questioning gender identity and transgressing gender 
boundaries. (Johnson 1987, 1)  
The attitudes towards women of Charles Arrowby in The Sea, The Sea (1978) and Hilary 
Burde in A Word Child (1975) are patronising and patriarchal, but as Johnson signals, these 
attitudes are expressed ironically within self-subverting first person narratives. Murdoch’s 
deconstruction of male domination is of a piece with her critique of bourgeois family 
structures that are shown to exert sustained damage to children. A Fairly Honourable Defeat 
(1970) represents a devastating critique of the smug, self-satisfied bourgeois family and 
offers depictions of male attitudes, maintained by Julius King and Rupert Foster that 
incarnate the demonic and the vain. Simon and Axel, a homosexual couple, manage to 
achieve a workable relationship but it is outside of traditional male sexual mores and Tallis 
appears to be good but his saintliness is outside the norm of male attitudes. Murdoch in 
‘Morals and Politics’ recognises that axioms establishing sexual equalities are disturbing 
forms of male power and are likely to be further developed in the future, while her novels 
pose questions for the prevalent inequalities between men and women. She does not, 
however, spell out a clear commitment to feminism. 
Murdoch’s Novels, Morals and Politics 
Murdoch’s reading of the relations between morals and politics in MGM allows for inter-
relations between the two. A number of her novels also trace relations between morals and 
politics. Murdoch’s novels do not simply rehearse philosophical doctrines but deal with 
issues and circumstances phenomenologically that she reflects upon in her philosophical 
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work. Hence novels such as The Nice and the Good (1968) and An Accidental Man (1971) 
show characters grappling with tensions between the spheres of morals and politics that are 
focused upon in her late study of the two spheres in MGM. What they show is that characters 
can feel and appreciate the distinct duties of the moral and political spheres. An individual 
cannot simply deny an obligation to support his state at a time of war and yet equally he or 
she has to consider the moral obligations of how others are to be treated. Likewise the state 
demands that public officials are to held to account and yet a particular recognition of one’s 
duties to another might be seen as requiring us to relax our concern to hold a public official to 
account.  
The distinction between personal and public forms of morality underlies Murdoch’s 
most expressly political novel, The Nice and the Good (1968). Its principal protagonist, John 
Ducane has to choose between his political and moral obligations. At the request of his head 
of department, Octavian Gary and the Prime Minister, Ducane, a legal advisor to a 
government department, leads an inquiry into the death of one of its members, Radeechy. At 
the same time, Ducane is developing a Platonic relationship with Kate Gray, Octavian’s wife, 
who lives on their Trescombe estate in Dorset. Ducane enjoys the ‘niceness’ of his relations 
with Kate, which counterpoint the edginess of his relations with his girlfriend, Jessica, whose 
insecurity inhibits him from acting on his resolution to end their affair. Kate is warm and 
expansive in entertaining her friends, Mary Clothier and Paula Biranne, and their children, 
while enjoying her relaxed relationship with Ducane. She avoids demanding emotions and 
close observation of herself and others. Her reflecting on her relationship to Ducane is 
exemplary. ‘How lovely it is, thought Kate, to be able to fall in love with one’s old friends. 
It’s one of the pleasures of being middle-aged. Not that I’m really in love, but it’s just like 
being in love with all the pain taken away’ (Murdoch 1968, 124). 
Kate’s self-absorption counterpoints Ducane’s close attention to others. He is 
prepared to offer and receive love, and is affected by the depraved forces contaminating the 
political world that his investigative work into the affairs of the department has revealed. His 
own moral sensitivity is heightened in risking his life to save Pierce, Mary’s son. In so doing 
he realises his love for Mary, which contrasts with the ersatz painless ‘nice’ love that is 
imagined by Kate. He takes his love for Mary to indicate a fundamental goodness in the 
world, to which he should devote himself. His state of mind is captured in the following 
observation: ‘Her mode of being gave him a moral, even a metaphysical, confidence in the 
world, in the reality of goodness’ (Murdoch 1968, 332). Ducane’s insight into goodness 
inspires him to set up the reunion of Paula and her husband, Richard Biranne, who is 
implicated in the death of Radeechy. Due to his moral commitment to help Paula, he refrains 
from including any damaging reference to Biranne in his official report on the death. 
Ducane’s selfless assistance to Paula reflects his sense of goodness and his personal 
perfectionist moral commitment. A commitment to the good demands that an individual acts 
according to a standard of goodness that is distinct from self-interest in its recognition of 
relational commitments to others. At the same time Ducane’s moral perfectionism that 
requires his commitment to help Paula and her husband represents a dereliction of his 
political duty to his department and to the Prime Minister. His political duty is to provide an 
inclusive report, which might re-establish public confidence in the political establishment and 
the norms of society. Politics is above all about security and demands that citizens trust in 
government and its personnel. Ducane’s neglect of his political duty is justified by the 
personal virtue of his action, but the tension between his moral and political duties leads him 
to resign from his post.  
Ducane’s resignation over his failure to produce the full facts in his report contrasts 
with the relaxed attitude of his head of department, Octavian Gray. At the close of the novel 
8 
 
the latter accepts the thinness of Ducane’s report, because the Radeechy affair is of receding 
significance. Politics operates by doing what is pragmatically necessary. Trust in public 
officials is required but if there is no threat to trust then standards can be relaxed. Octavian, 
like Kate, is nice and bourgeois rather than committed to perfectionist moral ideals. He is 
temperamentally suited to being a political actor. He is concerned with what works rather 
than with the good. He is not overly troubled by the demands of personal morality and, as is 
characteristic of top civil servants, he can be economical with the truth. With a similar 
worldliness he also conceals his affair with a secretary, just as Kate can renew her social life 
in the absence of Ducane. Ducane’s uneasiness at his failure to discharge his political 
obligation points to Murdoch’s recognition of the delicate balance between political and 
personal moral obligations. Politics, in MGM, is not a Utopian project (MGM, 356). It is 
about establishing and maintaining the rules of the game, which provide security in the public 
world. The Nice and the Good shows a related recognition of the differing spheres of morality 
and politics. Ducane, in his personal life, can be virtuous in pursuing the good but he is also 
aware of the need to provide security in the public sphere. The value of the world is to be 
respected but it does not transcend the perfectionist obligation of cultivating goodness.  
The tension between the political and the personal, which underpins Murdoch’s 
reading of moral and political life, surfaces in another Murdoch novel, An Accidental Man 
(1971) which explores a case of civil disobedience. In the novel Ludwig Leferrier, a young 
American historian, opts to remain in England rather than to return to the United States to 
serve his state in the Vietnam war. If he returns home Ludwig faces arrest for avoiding the 
draft, while if he remains in England he can take up a lecturing post and marry Gracie 
Tisbourne. Ludwig’s parents disapprove of their son’s projected marriage and regard 
avoidance of the draft a being politically dishonourable. They urge him to return home and 
not to betray political principles. Ludwig is opposed to the Vietnam War on moral grounds 
and hence considers his decision to remain in England to be morally justified. By the end of 
the novel, however, and in response to his changing attitude to the marriage and to his moral 
and political dilemma he decides to return to the USA and to face the consequences. Clearly 
there are opposing arguments about what Ludwig should do. The Vietnam War excited 
opposition on many grounds. Indeed Murdoch in her postscript to ‘On “God” and “Good”’ 
maintains the rightness of opposition to the war (Murdoch 2011, 8). Ludwig’s dilemma is 
complex and shaped by a number of contingent experiential considerations. His life in the 
UK appears attractive, he is in love and doubts the cause for which the USA is fighting. 
A super power fighting for indeterminate reasons and in controversial and largely 
ineffective ways appears to be unworthy of support. And yet a state requires a commitment 
from its citizens to maintain its basic rules which may be said to include its right to wage war. 
In the novel Murdoch does not take sides on the issue, and records the tension within Ludwig 
as he battles with his love for Gracie and his strained relations with his parents and also the 
more general tension between the personal and the political on a leading issue of the politics 
of the day. Ultimately the novel shows a character facing up to the consequences of civil 
disobedience, and being prepared to face punishment and popular disapproval, just as in 
MGM she allows civil disobedience just as long as individuals accept civil punishment for 
their transgressions against the law.  
Conclusion 
Throughout her career Murdoch tracked political events and was deeply interested in 
morality. A number of her novels show characters wrestling with political dilemmas. Jake 
Donoghue in Under the Net mixes with political radicals, feels the emotional pull of 
socialism but cannot articulate a reasoned commitment to its creed. Gerard Hernshaw in The 
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Book and the Brotherhood (1987) eschews radical utopianism for the security of a moderate 
political regime that supports parliamentary democracy. Both Ludwig Leferrier in An 
Accidental Man (1971) and John Ducane in The Nice and the Good (1968) have insight into 
the importance of the political sphere and respect what it offers. Yet they also recognise the 
force of personal morality. Leferrier’s conscience is stirred by what he takes to be an unjust 
war and he continues throughout the novel to maintain a principled opposition to the Vietnam 
War, but by its close he returns to the USA to accept punishment for his civil disobedience. 
His action respects a political duty to his state, just as John Ducane’s resignation from his 
public post recognises that he owes a loyalty to the public sphere notwithstanding the strength 
of his moral conviction in aiding a friend in a way that runs counter to official duty. 
Murdoch’s analysis of morals and politics in MGM distinguishes personal morality 
from public morality and she imagines that the political priority is to protect the individual 
citizen from harm while the object of personal morality is to pursue an ideal perfection. The 
dangers of the political arena are rehearsed in a number of her novels, and are intimated in the 
radical utopianism of Crimond in The Book and the Brotherhood that ignores the needs of 
ordinary individuals. (See Browning, 2018a)Yet Murdoch also sees connections between the 
public and the personal in that personal morality depends upon an ordered public world if it is 
to be undertaken successfully. Hence Ducane recognises the force of public authority while 
he operates so as to limit what he says in an official report. Likewise political rules and ideas 
can be questioned and developed via individual morality. A willingness to question American 
involvement in Vietnam and to practise civil disobedience on the issue is a theme of An 
Accidental Man and while the novel does not prescribe any lessons to the reader the practices 
of civil disobedience is presented as a plausible response to a political situation if respect is 
also shown to prevailing political authority.  
Murdoch’s metaphysics operates in order to make sense of experience by showing 
how forms of life and aspects of experience relate to one another. In her analysis of politics 
and morality in MGM she shows how perfectionist moral aspirations are both supported by 
the security that is provided by political order but are also necessarily distinct from the 
imperfect and pragmatic world of politics. Political perfectionism is to be guarded against, 
given the tendency for political radicalism to generate injustice and violence, and yet the 
political world is also to be valued and respected as a means of securing order and justice. 
She recognises that metaphysics cannot provide an absolute set of principles for the political 
world just as moral life is to be determined by individuals situated in specific situations and 
making particular judgments. While Murdoch’s sense that the axioms of the political world 
are not absolute represents a reasonable reading of the changeable historical world in which 
politics take place, her account is elliptical in that it does not provide a rich description of 
how changes of axioms might take place. She entertains the idea of international rights and 
governance without specifying how it might operate and she does not expand upon her 
recognition of women’s rights to provide an indication of what further women’s rights might 
be required. Murdoch’s account of the metaphysics of morals and politics is elliptical, but it 
does locate politics and morals on the map of experience so as to guide judgments on what is 
appropriate in both arenas.  
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